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Introduction 
For years, economists have debated the respective merits of in-
come and consumption bases for taxation. The United States uses 
consumption-based taxes far less than most other developed 
Western nations. In 1985, the 23 members of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development obtained an average 30 
percent of their revenue from taxes on consumption (see Table 1 ). 
For the United States, the ratio was 18 percent. 
Many people believe that it is fairer to tax individuals on what 
they take from society, rather than on what they contribute by 
working and investing. In the nineteenth century, classical 
economist John Stuart Mill made this point in advocating the ex-
emption of saving as part of a 'just" income tax system. In the 
1940s, American economist Irving Fisher argued that the income tax 
involved double taxation of saving and distorted the choice of indi-
viduals in favor of consumption. According to this view, not only is 
the income tax unjust, it encourages consumption and leisure at the 
expense of thrift and enterprise. 
The U.S. Treasury actually proposed a "spendings tax" in 1942 as 
a temporary wartime measure to curb inflation. The proposal was 
quickly rejected by Congress. A major political argument against 
the expenditures tax -- then and now -- is that the exemption of 
saving would favor the rich who are better able to save large 
portions of their incomes. Proponents of an expenditures tax re-
spond that it can be made as steeply progressive as desired. 
Moreover, the recent trend in income taxation in the United States 
has been away from progressivity and toward a flatter, more 
proportional revenue structure. The 1981 and 1986 tax acts are 
striking cases in point. Another objection to the consumption base 
is that it would favor the miser over the spendthrift, even when both 
have similar spending power or ability to pay. The response offered 
to this argument is that consumption uses up the resources available 
to the nation, while work and saving add to these resources. 
In practice, much of the impact of shifting to a consumption base 
would depend on how the tax is structured. The two major alterna-
tives are an expenditures tax levied on total purchases within an 
accounting period and a value-added tax collected on each purchase. 
Murray L. Weidenbaum is director of the Center for the Study of American 
Business and Ernest S. Christian, Jr. is a partner in the Washington law firm 
of Patton, Boggs and Blow. This report is adapted from a chapter in The 
Value-Added Tax: Orthodoxy and New Thinking (Norwell, Mass.: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1989). 
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Table 1 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF TAX REVENUES IN 
SELECTED COUNTRIES BY MAJOR SOURCE, 
FISCAL YEAR 1985 
Social 
Income Security Taxes on All 
Country Taxes Taxes Consumption Other 
Austria 54% 0% 33% 13% 
Australia 26 32 33 9 
Belgium 41 33 24 2 
Canada 44 13 32 11 
Denmark 55 4 34 7 
Finland 50 9 37 4 
France 17 44 29 10 
Germany 35 36 26 3 
Greece 17 35 43 5 
Ireland 34 15 45 6 
Italy 36 35 25 4 
Japan 46 30 14 10 
Luxembourg 45 25 24 6 
Netherlands 26 44 26 4 
New Zealand 69 0 23 8 
Norway 40 21 37 2 
Portugal 29 26 43 2 
Spain 28 42 26 4 
Sweden 42 25 26 7 
Switzerland 41 32 19 8 
Turkey 45 5 44 6 
United Kingdom 39 18 31 12 
United States 43 29 18 10 
AVERAGE 40% 26% 30% 4% 
Source: American Council for Capital Formation. 
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In theory, the base of the two taxes is the same -- the value of goods 
and services purchased. The yields could be similar. 
An Expenditures Tax 
An expenditures tax would be collected in much the same man-
ner as the income tax. The annual taxpayer return would continue 
to be the heart of the collection system. Only one major change 
would be made; the portion of income that is saved would, in effect, 
be exempt from taxation. 
Having so recently curtailed deductions for saving, it is 
unlikely that Congress will reverse course and exempt 
all saving by shifting to an expenditures tax. 
For a while, the United States was moving toward an expendi-
tures tax, albeit indirectly and in modest steps. The establishment of 
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) enabled many federal tax-
payers to defer paying taxes on amounts saved and invested in an 
IRA (up to $2,000 a year). Also, the first $100 of dividends received 
by a taxpayer was excluded from gross income. The Tax Reform 
Act of 1986, however, greatly reduced the incentives for investing in 
IRAs and eliminated the dividend exclusion. Having so recently 
curtailed deductions for saving, it is unlikely that Congress will in 
the near future reverse course and effectively exempt all saving by 
shifting to an expenditures tax. 
A Value-Added Tax 
Attention has shifted to forms of national sales taxes, notably a 
value-added tax. Such a consumption-based tax could be levied in 
addition to the currently collected taxes (although substitutions are 
possible). After having lain dormant for nearly a decade, interest in 
a value-added tax in the United States has reemerged primarily 
because of the conjunction of two economic factors -- budget and 
trade deficits. 
Sources of Revenue for Deficit Reduction 
There are political and economic proponents of additional fed-
eral tax revenues who want to use such revenues for two inconsistent 
policy objectives-- reducing the federal budget deficit and satisfying 
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pent-up demand for new or increased domestic spending programs. 
Both pressures are well understood, although the latter is not spo-
ken of in public very often. 
Although less clearly understood, it is also likely the case that we 
are. near the end of the era in which the income tax can provide 
maJor new revenues to the federal government. As the result of re-
cent tax reforms, primarily in 1986, the base of the income tax has 
been broadened just about as much as is politically possible. 
In~ome tax rates were drastically reduced in 1986 primarily as 
the drrect result of a strong political force which is still at work. 
High marginal rates of tax, which were born in a war-time era and 
designe? to apply to the rich, w~re being applied to a broad range of 
people m the newly affluent middle class who certainly do not con-
sider themselves to be "rich." Having substantially reduced tax rates 
twice in the 1980s, it will be exceedingly painful for the Congress to 
rev~rse course and reimpose high rates of tax on income. The ap-
petite for low tax rates was whetted, not satisfied, when the old idea 
of steeply "progressive" rates was effectively discarded almost 
without comment. 
As a potential revenue raiser, the sheer size of a value-added tax 
base is unequaled by the current income tax base or payroll tax base, 
each of which has been severely limited by political judgments over 
several decades. The value-added tax base roughly corresponds to 
the tot.al output of goods and services in the economy plus imports 
and mmus exports. For example, a comprehensive value-added tax 
base in 1987 might have amounted to approximately $2.5 trillion.1 
That year a value-added tax of 3.5 percent on the comprehensive 
base could have raised approximately the same revenue as the pre-
sent corporate income tax with its generally applicable rate of 34 
percent. A value-added tax of about 16 percent could have raised 
about the same revenue as the present individual income tax which 
applies 15 percent and 28 percent rates. 
Computing a Value-Added Tax 
.~ expenditures tax can be calculated via a "top down" approach, 
buildmg on the records that are already available to provide the 
data needed for enforcement of corporate and personal income 
taxes. In contrast, a yalue-added tax (VAT) represents a very dif-
ferent way o~ ~ollectmg a general tax on consumption. It is, in 
effect, a sophisticated and comprehensive sales tax which avoids the 
double counting otherwise inevitable when the same item moves 
from manufacturer to wholesaler to retailer. In total a VAT should 
be e'!uivalent in yield to a single-stage sales tax levi~d at the retail 
level. 
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A firm's value-added is the difference between its sales and its 
purchases from other firms. As shown in Table 2, value-added can 
also be estimated by adding labor and capital inputs supplied by the 
firm itself -- represented by wages and salaries, rent and interest 
payments and profit. 
In practice, the collection of the VAT may not be 
as simple as it is in concept. 
A variety of approaches has been suggested for collecting the 
new tax. The most familiar is the invoice and credit method (see 
Table 3). Under this approach, the tax is computed initially on a 
company's total sales and the firm is given credit for the VAT paid 
by its suppliers. To a substantial degree, the VAT would be self-
enforcing. 
In practice, the collection of the VAT may not be as simple as it 
is in concept. That would be the case if certain transactions were 
exempted (such as food) and if non-profit institutions and govern-
ment enterprises were treated differently. Exemptions are no minor 
matter in terms of the administrative complexity that they generate. 
In France, a long and extensive debate occurred over whether or not 
Head and Shoulders anti-dandruff shampoo was a medicine (tax-
exempt) or a cosmetic subject to the full VAT. Food eaten away 
from the business at which it was purchased may be tax-exempt. 
What happens if a McDonald's sets up tables outside of the 
restaurant?3 
The "Business Transfer Tax" Proposal 
While budget deficits and trade policy may increase the political 
and economic interest in a value-added tax, the introduction in 1985 
of the Business Transfer Tax (BTI) proposal by Senator William 
Roth, a senior member of the Senate Finance Committee, gener-
ated concerns that such taxes might not have the financial effects on 
businesses and consumers which have long been assumed. The sub-
stance and structure of the proposed BTI attracted attention and in 
some cases generated considerable alarm. 
As a generic value-added tax computed by the basic subtraction 
method (without the more familiar invoice and credit mechanisms), 
the BTI raised some doubts about the traditional analysis of value-
added taxes. Could it be that consumption taxes in general -- or at 
least this particular consumption tax -- might not be passed along in 
full to consumers? Could ardent business proponents of consump-
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Table 2 
TWO METHODS OF COMPUTING 
VALUE ADDED IN PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION 
Raw 
Materials Manu- Whole-
Item Producer facturer saler 
Purchases of inputs $100 $500 
Value Added: 
Wages $60 $275 $200 
Rent 10 25 40 
Interest 10 50 25 
Profit 20 50 35 
Total Value Added $100 $400 $300 
Sales of output $100 $500 $800 
Note: Value added can be estimated in two ways: 
(1) Deducting purchases from sales of output 
($2,400 - $1,400 = $1,000) or, 
Cumulative 
Retailer Total 
$800 $1,400 
$100 $635 
50 125 
25 110 
25 130 
$200 $1,000 
$1,000 $2,400 
(2) Adding inputs by the frrm itself (excluding inputs 
supplied by others) ($635 + $125 + $110 + $130 = $1,000). 
tion taxes find that they had actually been promoting a tax which 
becomes just one more business cost rather than a tax that is borne 
solely by consumers? Coupling the BTT proposal with the fact that 
the Canadian government was also discussing a subtraction method 
value-added tax at that time resulted in a period of substantive study 
by business executives, as well as professional analysts, of the real-
world effects of such taxes. 
Pros and Cons of a VAT 
Reasons for Favoring a Value-Added Tax 
Proponents of a VAT contend that it is economically neutral, 
because ideally it would be levied at a uniform rate on the entire 
consumption base. It does not distort choices among products or 
methods of production. Thus, shifting to more capital-intensive and 
6 
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Table 3 
COMPUTING THE VAT USING THE CREDIT METHOD 
Raw Materials Manu- Whole-
Item Producer facturer saler Retailer 
Sales of output $100 $500 $800 $1,000 
Less purchases ~ -100 -500 -800 
Value added $100 $400 $300 $200 
Tax on total sales $10 $50 $80 $100 
Credit on purchases -- -10 -50 -80 
-
Tax liability $10 $40 $30 $20 
Note: Assumes 10 percent VAT on a consumption basis. 
perhaps more profitable methods of production does not influence 
the tax burden. Nor is the allocation of resources across product 
markets, and industry lines affected. In these regards, the VAT is 
far superior to the existing array of selective excise taxes. In addi-
tion, advocates of a VAT point out that, in contrast to an income 
tax, there is no penalty for efficiency and no subsidy for waste. 
One argument in favor of the United States adopting a VAT is 
that so many other nations have adopted this form of taxation. It 
fits in better than other taxes with the growing international 
character of production. The VAT has become one of the revenue 
workhorses of the world. Virtually every important country in 
Europe imposes the tax, and it has spread throughout the Third 
World.4 France has used value-added taxation since 1955, and other 
members of the European Common Market have done so since the 
late 1960s or early 1970s. Japan's 3 percent consumption tax will 
take effect on April 1, 1989. If Canadian proposals to implement 
income and sales tax reforms while enacting border-adjustable 
value-added taxes are adopted, the United States will be left as the 
only major industrialized democracy which does not utilize a tax sys-
tem that allows imports to be taxed at the border and exports to 
leave the country free of such tax. 
At first blush, a VAT would seem to help reduce this nation's 
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presently large trade deficit. However, many economists believe 
that fluctuations in exchange rates would largely offset these initial 
effects and result in little change in the balance of trade. 
Basis of Opposition 
Opponents of a VAT offer an extensive list of shortcomings. 
They contend that a VAT, like any consumption-based revenue 
source, is inherently regressive. Those least able to pay face the 
highest overall burdens. Such regressivity can be softened by re-
moving food and medicine from the VAT base or by making refunds 
to low-income taxpayers, but these variations make the collection of 
the tax more complicated. It would also provide some opportunity 
for people in the underground economy to avoid paying taxes. 5 
Assuming a VAT is included in the price of purchases, it registers 
in all of the price indices and, hence, exerts an inflationary force on 
the economy. The counter-argument is that this is only a one-time 
effect (occurring when the tax is enacted or increased). Also, the in-
flationary impact could be offset by appropriate changes in 
monetary policy, albeit at times with an adverse effect on the levels 
of production and employment. Opponents also charge that a VAT 
would invade the area of sales taxation, traditionally reserved for 
state and local governments. 
Imposition of a VAT in the United States is said to require es-
tablishing a new tax collection system by the federal government and 
new recordkeeping on the part of taxpayers. The Treasury Depart-
ment, based on European experience, believes it would need 18 
months after enactment to begin administering a VAT.6 
Other Fundamental Issues 
Any debate about value-added taxes quickly sparks renewed dis-
cussions of many long-standing, fundamental issues of tax policy 
such as the saving rate in the United States by both individuals and 
corporations, the relative burden of tax borne by capital and labor, 
taxes on individuals versus taxes on corporations, the relative bur-
den of tax on one type of business compared to another, and the 
effects of the tax system on international trade. Affecting all of 
these issues are two recurring questions. Who pays the tax? Who 
bears the economic incidence? 
For example, the anticipated boost to personal saving resulting 
from a value-added tax rests on the assumption that such a tax is 
borne by consumers and thus will make consumption relatively more 
expensive than saving. But if the tax is not borne primarily by con-
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sumers and is, instead, a proportional tax on the output of labor and 
the output of capital, will there be a boost to personal saving? 
Would corporate saving be enhanced if this proportional tax on la-
bor and capital were substituted for the corporate income tax, which 
presumably is borne primarily by capital? Conversely, would the in-
crease in the relative cost of labor prove to be a source of 
regressivity, even if a value-added tax is not assumed to be passed 
on to consumers? 
The issue of taxing corporations versus taxing individuals takes 
on a unique character when considering a value-added tax. In the 
in~ome and payroll tax contexts, the corporation is the entity which 
wntes the check to the government, and no effort is made to 
allocate such taxes to individuals as shareholders or employees of 
the corporate payors. But in a value-added context, the corporation 
writes the check while individuals as consumers are assumed to be 
bearing the burden. Why does this distinction exist? 
The anticipated boost to personal saving resulting 
from a value-added tax rests on the assumption 
that such a tax is borne by consumers. 
Collecting certain taxes from corporations and then pretending 
that such tax burdens are not actually borne by individuals (either as 
shareholde~s, employees or consumers) is a lamentable political 
pr~cess which should have been abandoned long ago. In an era in 
which ~undreds of ~illions of dollars of individuals' pension funds, 
IRAs, msurance policy assets and personal investments are in the 
form of corporate stocks and bonds, it is difficult to understand the 
argument that people are not bearing the cost of the tax on corpo-
rate profits. Perhaps a free-wheeling debate about the nature of the 
relationship between incidence and payment of value-added taxes 
could at least lead to similar considerations with respect to income 
and payroll taxes. 
There is a burgeoning concern within the business community 
that a value-added tax may weigh more heavily on some lines of 
business than others. Do these concerns arise because managers 
see their businesses (i.e., their shareholders) as paying the tax or be-
cause they think that their customers would pay it? 
The possibility of exempting certain goods from a value-added 
tax presents the most stunning example of how important it is to 
consider very carefully the question of who pays the tax and who 
bears the economic incidence. Assume, for example, that the value-
added tax is a tax on producers of goods or services, comparable in 
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that respect to the present corporate income tax and payroll taxes. 
If a value-added tax were substituted for present taxes and if certain 
commodities such as food and medicine were exempted from tax, 
the result would be essentially the same as exempting the producers 
of those commodities from the corporate income tax and payroll tax. 
How would that affect the flows of investments to, and the values of 
stock in, taxable and nontaxable companies? 
To the extent that international trade advantages can be obtained 
by substituting a border-adjustable value-added tax for some existing 
tax, any favorable change in the trade price of goods will depend 
heavily on whether the value-added tax has the same or similar inci-
dence as the tax it replaces. The presumption that a value-added tax 
would have a favorable effect on trade does not mesh easily with the 
presumption that such a tax is paid in full by consumers. 
Macroeconomic Effects 
On the basis of expected 1990 levels of economic activity, a one 
percent VAT would yield approximately $20-40 billion in federal 
revenue (depending on the coverage of the tax). Thus, at a five per-
cent rate, the VAT might virtually eliminate the $150 billion annual 
deficit in the federal budget. Even with exemptions for food, 
housing, and medical care, the estimated annual receipts from a five 
percent VAT would be approximately $60 billion. 
However, fiscal flows of such magnitude likely would generate a 
variety of other impacts on the economy. For example, these esti-
mates of the yield of the VAT assume that the Federal Reserve will 
follow an accommodating monetary policy, with a somewhat infla-
tionary effect. 
Because the withdrawal of such a substantial amount of pur-
chasing power would act as a depressant on the economy, a tax of 
that magnitude likely would be phased in over a period of time. 
One econometric analysis concludes that the economy would grow 
about one percent more slowly for each percent of VAT and that in-
flation would be one and a half to two percent higher during an 
initial adjustment period. 7 
In policy terms, the institution of a VAT in the United States in 
the 1990s should properly be viewed in contrast to likely alterna-
tives: 
• Increases in income tax rates; 
• Reductions in general outlays for defense and entitlements; or 
• Continued high levels of deficit financing. 
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E~ch of these three alternatives would be accompanied by sub-
stantial burdens or costs, although they would differ from those 
generated by the imposition of a consumption-based tax such as a 
VAT. Reversal of the 1980s trend toward lower marginal income 
tax r~tes would reduce the incentives to work, save, and invest. Sub-
stantial. furthe~ r~~uctions in ~ilitary and civilian spending might, 
d~pend~g on m?IVI?ual value judgments, impair the achievement of 
VIt~l na.ti?nal obJ~C~Ives --such as protecting the national security or 
mamtammg the livmg standards of the elderly. Continued high lev-
els of deficit spending would bring their own set of drawbacks 
ranging from high real interest rates to upward pressure on the dol~ 
lar and thus on the foreign trade deficit. 
Outlook 
Taxpayers may prefer a low-rate VAT to the income tax if their 
apparent attitude toward sales taxes is any indication. Yet, politi-
Ciat;ts fear VAT because they fear it is regressive. Companies mar-
ket~g consumer pro~ucts fear that the higher prices will reduce 
the~ sales and p~ofits. C_?nversely, companies selling capital 
eq~npment and bus!-fless services tend to take a more sympathetic 
~ttitude toward this form of government revenue, which would 
lighten the tax burden on their customers and hence tend to ex-
pand their markets. ' ' 
Some observers of national policymaking are reluctant to support 
any new tax on the assumption that the added revenues would make 
it ha.r?er for members of the Congress to turn down proposals for 
ambitious ~~w. government spending programs. In their view, the 
budget deficit likely would change little. 
Selective Excise Taxes 
Considerable support exists for a partial move toward federal 
consumption or sales taxes, which would be accomplished by linking 
the tax to an important policy objective. For example, some 
propose an energy tax to help slow down the rising imports of oil. A 
$5 a barrel oil import fee would raise about $17 billion in 1990. A 
more ambitious measure to dampen energy demand -- a $5 a barrel 
t~ .on ?omestic and imported oil-- would yield approximately $21 
billion m the same year. One argument against such selective taxes 
is that they dis~rim~ate against a single form of energy, petroleum. 
~ co~prehensive .five ~e~cent tax on all domestic energy consump-
tion, m contrast, IS anticipated to bring $16 billion a year into the 
U.S. Treasury. 
11 
More modest tax proposals include raising the federal excise rate 
on beer and wine to equal the rate on distilled spirits -- a $6 billion 
revenue-raiser in 1990. Doubling the tax on cigarettes from 16 cents 
to 32 cents a pack would yield $3 billion. Finally, linking the tobacco 
and alcohol excises to the rate of inflation would increase Treasury 
revenues $1 billion a year by 1990. Clearly, the federal government 
does use selective sales taxes to raise revenue, although not to the 
extent that state and local governments do. Nevertheless, the an-
nual yield of federal excises is substantial. As shown in Table 4, this 
form of taxation produced over $32 billion in revenue for the 
Treasury in the fiscal year 1987. 
Also, in the case of a comprehensive VAT, linkage to a popular 
expenditure program would make passage more likely. Su~estions 
include initiatives on education, health care, and investment. 
Value-Added Tax as a Substitute 
Although the current political interest in a value-added tax has 
arisen primarily from its potential to raise revenues to reduce the 
federal deficit, the substitution of a value-added tax for all or por-
tions of existing income and payroll taxes is also a possibility. In 
fact, the most recent proposals in the United States have explicitly 
included such proposals. 
In 1980, H.R. 7015 was introduced by Rep. Al Ullman. It pro-
vided for individual and corporate income tax rate reductions, 
liberalized depreciation rules, expanded retirement savings provi-
sions and reduced Social Security taxes, all of which were offset by a 
10 percent tax applied to a moderately-narrow value-added base 
(which excluded food, housing, medical care, farmers, fisherman, 
mass transit, interest and exports). 
In 1985, Senator William Roth introduced S. 1102, which called 
for a credit against Social Security tax liabilities based on Business 
Transfer Tax (BTT) liabilities under a five percent rate applied to a 
base similar to the earlier Ullman proposal. The bill also included a 
sense of the Senate provision which called for using the net BTT 
revenues (after the Social Security credit) to reduce individual tax 
rates and to provide increased individual saving incentives. In 
February 1986, Senator Roth outlined explicit income tax rate re-
ductions and investment-related provisions which would be funded 
by revenues from an eight percent BTT (after the Social Security 
credit) applied to a much broader base than his earlier proposal. 
In 1986, Rep. Richard Schulze introduced H.R. 4598, which 
called for repealing the corporate minimum tax and enhancing the 
capital recovery provisions with revenues from a seven percent 
Business Alternative Minimum Tax. Credits would be allowed 
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Table 4 
REVENUE FROM FEDERAL EXCISE TAXES 
Fiscal Year 1987 
Source 
Alcohol 
Tobacco 
Highway: 
Gasoline 
Diesel fuel 
Tires, etc. 
Subtotal 
Airports and airways 
Telephone 
All other 
Amount 
(in billions) 
$6.0 
4.8 
8.7 
2.8 
1.8 
13.3 
3.0 
2.5 
2.9 
$32.5 
Percent of total 
18% 
15 
41 
9 
8 
..2 
100% 
Source: Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1989. 
against the corporate income tax and Social Security liabilities. 
Substitution of a value-added tax for some portion of existing 
taxes seems a likely feature of any legislation for several reasons. 
Politically, the process of enacting a new tax is all but certain to 
require the building of a coalition from diverse interests. The "cost" 
of blending such diversity could well include reductions in existing 
income or payroll rates and/ or re-enactment of prior income tax 
provisions which were repealed or restricted in 1986. Economically, 
the incidence debate could produce pressures to compensate in 
some way for the burdens of the new tax. It is interesting to specu-
late about the diversity of proposals which could arise -- payroll tax 
cuts, low income credits, corporate rate cuts, capital formation 
provisions -- depending on one's perspective. 
Too Much Revenue: Is There Any Restraint? 
The value-added tax is widely perceived as an almost unlimited 
source of federal tax revenue. That is true only in the sense that a 
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relatively low rate of value-added tax -- compared to the present 
high rates of corporate and individual income taxes -- would raise 
substantial amounts, if applied to a comprehensive base. Despite 
this theoretical revenue potential, there are obvious practical 
restraints, not the least of which is the percentage of GNP that may 
be extracted in taxes without stifling the economy. 
Consider the possibility that Congress merely enacts a generic 
value-added tax which is paid by the producers of goods or services 
in proportion to the value that is added by each and that is under-
stood to be the substantial equivalent of the present corporate 
income tax and payroll tax. Having in mind that corporate income 
taxes are already approximately one-third of corporate profits (as 
computed for income tax purposes), is it realistic to suppose that 
such a value-added tax would be imposed to extract another one-
third or that the value-added tax rate might be increased another 
percentage point or two so that the combination of corporate in-
come tax and value-added tax payments would equal or exceed 
corporate profits? 
The short-tenn outlook is for a substantial increase 
in the tax burden levied on private corporations. 
Alternatively, assume that the popular view prevails and the 
value-added tax is considered to be a tax on consumption. Two 
commonly-voiced concerns would immediately come to the fore. 
One is that the value-added tax is a "money machine" which can 
readily be increased a percentage point or two almost unnoticed in 
the general mix of price fluctuations, state sales taxes, etc. The 
other concern is that any consumption tax is a major burden on con-
sumers which may cause political revolt and could be enacted only 
at great political danger to all incumbents. Both concerns are ex-
pressed by opponents, but it is difficult to see how both can be 
correct. 
Summary 
In any event, the short-term outlook is for a substantial increase 
in the tax burden levied by the federal government on private corpo-
rations. Specifically, as a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
corporate income tax payments in 1990 are expected to reach ap-
proximately $130 billion -- double the 1986 total and more than 
triple the amount collected by the Treasury in 1983. 
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The corporate tax increases in the 1986 law -- coupled with the 
more modest revenue bills passed in 1982 and 1984 -- more than 
offset the substantial corporate income cuts enacted in 1981 as part 
of the supply-side Economic Recovery Tax Act. Total corporate in-
come tax payments to the federal government in 1991 are estimated 
to reach about $140 billion, or 40 percent more than they would 
have been had the pre-1981 tax law remained in effect. 
The impact of taxation on business is most uneven. Increasing 
reliance on consumption taxes would likely hit consumer-oriented 
companies particularly hard. However, a VAT would likely be a 
lower burden on a highly profitable industry than a simple rate in-
crease on corporate profits. In contrast, increasing excise taxes 
selectively could wind up pitting one industry group against another, 
with substantial incentive for businesses to use the political process 
to achieve advantages or avoid disadvantages. 
In short, the yawning federal deficit is reviving interest in another 
round of tax "reform." Recent tax changes designed to be "revenue 
neutral" have shifted the tax burden from the low-saving sector 
(families and individuals) to high-saving sector (businesses). Some 
form of VAT is thus likely to be debated and perhaps inaugurated in 
the near future. The economic impacts of such a shift in the basis of 
taxation must be carefully examined beforehand. Winners and 
losers are unavoidable in any major tax change, but Congress should 
obtain a clear understanding of its benefits and costs before em-
bracing a major new revenue source. 
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